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ENFORCING FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE
CURRENT DISARRAY OF FEDERAL FORUMSELECTION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND A
PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL REFORM
Maxwell J. Wright*
This Note examines the current disarray of federal forum-selection
clause jurisprudence. Theoretically, a forum-selection clause can
provide a degree of stability and predictability to a contractual
relationship by limiting where the parties can sue or be sued under the
contract. Unfortunately, a lack of Supreme Court guidance and the
absence of a federal rule or statue on point have created confusion and
varying approaches among lower federal courts as to how they should
treat such clauses. This Note outlines the various approaches that
federal courts currently employ when enforcing valid exclusive forumselection clauses, and it highlights the strengths and weaknesses of
each approach. It then proposes a simple, uniform solution that is
aimed at abrogating the current confusion among federal courts in
order to allow exclusive forum-selection clauses to perform their
central function—to provide predictability, stability, and foreseeability
to contractual relationships regarding where litigation may occur.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. Legal Studies,
University of California, Santa Cruz. I would like to express my utmost gratitude to Professor
Allan Ides for all of his help throughout the process of writing this Note. I would also like to
thank Milena Shtelmakher, Elena DeCoste Grieco, Joshua Rich, and the editors and staff
members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Last, but far from least, I would like to thank
my grandmother, Dorothy Wright; my parents, Perry and Jackie Wright; my brothers, Alex and
Charlie Wright; and my wonderful girlfriend, Amber Ventura, for encouraging me to pursue my
dreams and for supporting me throughout my journey.

1625

1626

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1625

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................1627
II. BACKGROUND ...........................................................................1628
A. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. ............................1629
B. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp......................1630
C. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute ..............................1632
III. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK ...............................................1635
A. Interpreting Forum-Selection Clauses: The Federal
Taxonomy .....................................................................1635
B. Lack of Uniformity Problem: Determining How the
Federal Courts Will Treat a Particular ForumSelection Clause............................................................1636
1. Does an Exclusive Clause Make Venue Proper in
an Otherwise Improper Forum?...............................1637
2. Does an Exclusive Clause Make Venue Improper
in an Otherwise Proper Forum?...............................1638
a. Motions to dismiss based on valid exclusive
forum-selection clauses ......................................1639
b. Motions to transfer based on valid exclusive
forum-selection clauses ......................................1642
IV. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW ...................................................1643
A. The Motion to Dismiss Problem: Examining the
Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Approach ..............1644
B. The Motion to Transfer Problem: § 1404(a) Versus
§ 1406(a) .......................................................................1646
1. The Van Dusen v. Barrack Rule ..............................1647
2. Sections 1404(a) and 1406(a): Application and
Implications .............................................................1648
V. THE REMEDY: A SIMPLE UNIFORM SOLUTION .........................1651
A. The Supreme Court Should Act.....................................1651
B. The Supreme Court’s Rule: How It Would Solve the
Forum-Selection Clause Problem .................................1652
VI. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................1654

Summer 2011] ENFORCING FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES

1627

I. INTRODUCTION
A plaintiff may believe “that as the initiator of a lawsuit he is the
lord and master of where the litigation will be tried and under what
law.”1 However, if his suit is based on a contract that contains a
forum-selection clause, “his view of himself as ruler of all he surveys
may, like an inflated balloon, suffer considerable loss of altitude.”2 A
forum-selection clause is a contract provision under which the parties
agree to file any suit arising under their contract in a specified
forum.3 In theory, forum-selection clauses can provide a degree of
predictability and stability to a contractual relationship by limiting
where parties can sue or be sued under the contract.4 Because the
right to litigate in one forum or another has an economic value that
can be estimated with reasonable certainty,5 forum-selection clauses
play a significant role in promoting business transactions where a
lack of certainty and foreseeability can impose great burdens on the
parties involved.6 Unfortunately, modern federal forum-selection
clause jurisprudence has rendered predictability, stability, and
foreseeability in this context a myth.
A lack of Supreme Court guidance, and the absence of a federal
rule or statute specifically addressing the enforceability of forumselection clauses, have led to confusion and varying approaches
among lower federal courts. As a result, whether a clause is
enforceable, and the appropriate procedural mechanisms with which
to enforce it, will depend on the particular federal court in which the
suit is filed. Thus, the federal system completely undermines one of
the central purposes of forum-selection clauses—to provide
predictability, stability, and foreseeability to a contractual
relationship. Current federal forum-selection clause jurisprudence
1. Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 2007).
2. Id.
3. ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 427
(3d ed. 2009).
4. See Young Lee, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in Diversity
Cases and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663, 663 (1997). Forum-selection clauses
play a particularly important role in both interstate and international commercial agreements. Id.
5. Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival
Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 57 (1992).
6. Lee, supra note 4, at 664.
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has made predicting the effect that a given forum-selection clause
will have on a federal court proceeding a daunting, if not impossible,
task.
This Note addresses the current confusion and uncertainty
surrounding the enforcement of forum-selection clauses in diversity
cases. Part II provides a background of federal forum-selection
clause jurisprudence. Part III outlines the variety of approaches that
federal courts currently employ when enforcing forum-selection
clauses. Part IV highlights the strengths and weaknesses of these
different approaches. Part V proposes that the Supreme Court should
act to clarify the appropriate federal procedural mechanisms that
courts should use when they enforce forum-selection clauses; further,
it explains how the proposal will function and recapitulates why such
changes are necessary. Finally, Part VI concludes this Note.
II. BACKGROUND
The history of forum-selection clause enforcement in the United
States is marked by evolution. In the nineteenth century, unlike the
courts in most other nations, U.S. courts uniformly refused to enforce
forum-selection agreements.7 This all changed during the second half
of the twentieth century,8 when forum-selection clauses began to gain
acceptance because of courts’ efforts to maintain parties’ contract
expectations.9 The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the increasing trend
of enforcing forum-selection clauses when it recognized the right of
parties to enter into “non-exclusive” forum-selection agreements10 in
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent.11 Since Szukhent, the
Court has addressed the forum-selection clause issue significantly in
three cases.

7. Borchers, supra note 5, at 56–57.
8. Id. at 57.
9. John McKinley Kirby, Note, Consumer’s Right to Sue at Home Jeopardized Through
Forum Selection Clause in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 70 N.C. L. REV. 888, 888 (1992).
10. For a definition and description of non-exclusive forum-selection clauses, see infra Part
III.A.
11. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (“[P]arties to a
contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court.”); Borchers, supra
note 5, at 62 (discussing the holding and effects of Szukhent).
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A. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
The first, and most notable, is the landmark case The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co.12 (“The Bremen”), which the Court decided in
1972. The Bremen was an admiralty case based on an international
towage contract.13 Zapata, a Houston-based American corporation,
contracted with Unterweser, a German corporation, to tow Zapata’s
ocean-going, self-elevating drilling rig (“the Chaparral”) from
Louisiana to a location off the coast of Italy, where Zapata had
planned to drill certain wells.14 The contract contained a forumselection clause providing that “any dispute arising must be treated
before the London Court of Justice.”15 In January of 1968,
Unterweser’s deep sea tug boat (“the Bremen”) departed Louisiana
with the Chaparral in tow; however, it did not reach its destination.16
While in international waters in the Gulf of Mexico, a severe storm
arose and caused serious damage to the Chaparral.17 Zapata
instructed the Bremen to tow the damaged rig to Tampa, Florida—
the nearest port of refuge.18 Several days later, Zapata, ignoring the
forum-selection clause, sued Unterweser in personam and the
Bremen in rem in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida in Tampa.19 Unterweser invoked the forum-selection clause
and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, on
forum non conveniens grounds.20
After the district court and the court of appeals denied both
motions, the Supreme Court reversed and, for the first time,
recognized the right to enter into reasonable “exclusive”21 forumselection clauses.22 The Court held that in admiralty cases, forumselection “clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced
unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

407 U.S. 1 (1972).
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
For a definition and description of exclusive forum-selection clauses, see infra Part III.A.
See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10; Borchers, supra note 5, at 57.
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‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances” for reasons of fraud, undue
influence, or overweening bargaining power.23 The Court explained
that the expansion of American business and industry would not be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, the courts insisted
on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under U.S.
laws and in U.S. courts.24 The Court ultimately vacated the court of
appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further consideration as
to whether enforcing the forum-selection clause was unreasonable
under the circumstances pursuant to the standards that the Court set
forth.25
B. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.
The Supreme Court next addressed the forum-selection clause
issue in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,26 a 1988 diversity
case.27 The dispute grew out of a dealership agreement that obligated
Stewart Organization (“Stewart”), an Alabama corporation, to
market copier products manufactured by Ricoh Corporation
(“Ricoh”), a nationwide manufacturer with its principal place of
business in New Jersey.28 The contract contained a forum-selection
clause providing that any suit arising under the contract could only
be brought in a court located in the borough of Manhattan in New
York City.29 At some point, the business relationship between the
parties deteriorated and Stewart, notwithstanding the forum-selection
clause, filed suit for breach of contract in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama.30 Relying on the forum-selection
clause, Ricoh moved to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

23. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10, 12.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 20.
26. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 24 n.1 (“Specifically, the forum-selection clause read: ‘Dealer and Ricoh agree that
any appropriate state or federal district court located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York
City, New York, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under or in
connection with this Agreement and shall be a proper forum in which to adjudicate such case or
controversy.’”).
30. Id. at 24.
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§ 1404(a)31 or to dismiss the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)32
for improper venue.33
The district court denied the motion.34 However, the court of
appeals reversed the district court’s decision on the grounds that
questions of venue in diversity cases are governed by federal law and
the parties’ forum-selection clause was enforceable under The
Bremen.35 The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision
to enforce the clause, but on somewhat different grounds.36 The
Court explained that it disagreed with the court of appeals’
articulation of the relevant issue in the case as whether the forumselection clause was unenforceable under The Bremen standards.37 It
noted that, although The Bremen may be instructive in resolving the
parties’ dispute, the federal common law that has developed under
admiralty jurisdiction cannot be freely transferred to diversity
cases.38 It then explained that the question for consideration was
actually whether § 1404(a) itself controlled Ricoh’s request to give
effect to the forum-selection clause and transfer the case to a court in
the designated forum.39
The Court ultimately held that federal law, specifically
§ 1404(a), governed the district court’s decision whether to give
effect to the forum-selection clause and transfer the case to a court in
the specified forum.40 It explained that a motion to transfer under
§ 1404(a) calls on the district court to balance certain case-specific
factors,41 and it reasoned that “[t]he presence of a forum-selection

31. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.”).
32. Id. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to
any district or division in which it could have been brought.”).
33. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 28–29.
38. Id. at 28.
39. Id. at 29.
40. Id. at 32. The Court did not address the propriety of the district court’s denial of the
§ 1406(a) motion to dismiss because the parties did not raise this issue on appeal. See id. at 28
n.8.
41. When courts exercise their discretion to transfer under § 1404(a), they
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clause . . . will be a significant factor that figures centrally in the . . .
court’s calculus.”42 The Court further explained that “[t]he forumselection clause, which represents the parties’ agreement as to the
most proper forum, should receive neither dispositive consideration
(as [Ricoh] might have [had] it) nor no consideration . . . .”43
C. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute
The last time the Supreme Court significantly addressed the
forum-selection clause issue was in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute44 in 1991, which was, like The Bremen, an admiralty case.45
The Shutes (a married couple) had purchased tickets from an
Arlington, Washington, travel agent for a seven-day cruise on
Carnival Cruise Lines’ (“Carnival”) ship the Tropicale.46 They paid
the agent for the tickets, and the agent forwarded the payment to
Carnival’s headquarters in Miami, Florida.47 Carnival then sent the
tickets to the Shutes in Washington.48 The face of each ticket
contained the following forum-selection clause:
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier
that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in
connection with or incident to this Contract shall be
litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State
of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any
other state or country.49

consider a number of factors, including a strong preference for plaintiff’s choice of
forum, ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory process for
unwilling witnesses, the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive, and public
interest factors, including the relative congestion of court dockets, choice of law
considerations, and the relationship of the community in which the courts and jurors
are required to serve to the occurrences that gave rise to the litigation.
IDES & MAY, supra note 3, at 422.
42. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29.
43. Id. at 31.
44. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
45. See id. at 587.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 587–88.
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The Shutes boarded the Tropicale in Los Angeles, California.50
The ship sailed to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, and returned to Los
Angeles.51 While en route, in international waters off the Mexican
coast, Mrs. Shute was injured when she slipped on a deck mat during
a guided tour of the ship’s galley.52 Notwithstanding the forumselection clause printed on their tickets, the Shutes sued Carnival in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
claiming that Carnival and its employees negligently caused
Mrs. Shute’s slip-and-fall accident.53
Carnival moved for the case to be dismissed or transferred
pursuant to § 1406(a).54 It argued that venue was improper in the
Western District of Washington because the forum-selection clause
required the Shutes to bring their suit in Florida,55 “to the exclusion
of the Courts of any other state.”56 In the alternative, Carnival moved
for dismissal on the basis that the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction over Carnival because Carnival’s contacts with
Washington were insufficient.57 The district court granted the motion
to dismiss based on insufficient contacts.58 However, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Carnival did,
in fact, have sufficient contacts with the forum state.59 Additionally,
relying on The Bremen, it held that the forum-selection clause was
unenforceable because the parties did not freely bargain for it.60 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the court of
appeals was correct in holding that the district court should have
heard the Shutes’ claim.61
The Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on
the basis that the forum-selection clause was dispositive; thus, it did

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 588.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 387.
Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 588.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Id.
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not address the personal jurisdiction issue.62 The Court distinguished
this case from The Bremen.63 It explained that while The Bremen
involved a far-from-routine transaction negotiated by two business
corporations, the passage contract at issue in this case was purely
routine, nearly identical to every passage contract that Carnival and
most other cruise lines issued, and was likely not negotiated.64 The
Court then refined the analysis of The Bremen to “account for the
realities of form passage contracts.”65 First, it rejected the court of
appeals’ finding that a non-negotiated forum-selection clause in a
form ticket contract is never enforceable simply because it was not
the subject of bargaining.66 Instead, the Court held that a reasonable
forum-selection clause in a form contract is permissible.67 However,
it emphasized that such clauses are subject to judicial scrutiny for
fundamental fairness.68 It then held that a party attempting to have
such a clause set aside for reasons of inconvenience bears a heavy
burden of proof, which the Shutes had failed to satisfy.69
The trifecta of cases described above has left the federal forumselection clause analysis in shambles because lower courts disagree
as to how they should interpret these cases collectively. First,
although it is uncontroverted that federal law applies to the validity
and enforceability of forum-selection clauses in admiralty cases,70
lower courts are split as to the law that applies in the context of
diversity jurisdiction.71 This confusion is rooted, in part, in the
courts’ differing interpretations of Stewart. Did the Stewart Court
hold that federal law generally applies to the validity and
enforceability of forum-selection clauses,72 or merely that federal
procedural standards govern the enforcement of otherwise valid and

62. Id.
63. Id. at 592–93.
64. Id. at 593.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 595.
69. Id. at 594–95.
70. Id. at 590; The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 12 (1972).
71. Ryan T. Holt, A Uniform System for the Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in
Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1913, 1926–29 (2009).
72. See M.B. Rests., Inc. v. CKE Rests., Inc., 183 F.3d 750, 752 n.4 (8th Cir. 1999).
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enforceable clauses?73 Additionally, confusion surrounding Stewart
and Carnival Cruise has led courts to disagree over the appropriate
procedural mechanisms that they should use when enforcing forumselection clauses.74 As a result, the federal courts are divided as to the
appropriate law to apply and mechanisms to use when they
determine when and how to enforce forum-selection clauses.75 This
Note will focus on the latter and will leave the applicable law
problem for future discussion.
III. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Interpreting Forum-Selection Clauses:
The Federal Taxonomy
When a federal court considers the implications of a contractual
forum-selection clause, its first step is determining the type of clause
it is being asked to enforce.76 The taxonomy that is generally
employed distinguishes between “mandatory” and “permissive”
clauses.77 A mandatory clause has been described as one that requires
any dispute arising under the contract to be brought only in a
specified state or foreign court.78 Alternatively, a permissive clause
has been described as one that allows a contract dispute to be brought
in either a state or federal court located in the designated forum.79
However, current case law indicates that courts no longer adhere
to the foregoing definitional framework. Currently, the general rule
is that a forum-selection clause is treated as mandatory (hereinafter
“exclusive”80) only if it contains clear, unambiguous language of the
parties’ intent to make the specified forum compulsory and
73. See Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 826 (6th Cir. 2009).
74. See infra Part III.B.
75. See Holt, supra note 71; infra Part III.B.
76. Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Under
federal law, the threshold question in interpreting a forum[-]selection clause is whether the clause
at issue is permissive or mandatory.”); Res Exhibit Servs., LLC v. Tecan Grp., Ltd., No. 09-CV6659, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60948, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2010) (“The first step for
assessing the enforceability of a forum[-]selection clause is to determine whether the clause is
mandatory or permissive.”).
77. Rivera, 575 F.3d at 17.
78. See IDES & MAY, supra note 3, at 427–28.
79. See id. at 428.
80. It is appropriate to label these clauses “exclusive” rather than “mandatory” because
doing so more adequately reflects their definition.
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exclusive.81 Therefore, a clause that merely authorizes jurisdiction in
a specified forum, but does not clearly prohibit litigation elsewhere,
will be interpreted as permissive (hereinafter “non-exclusive”82).83
Furthermore, if a clause is ambiguous or is subject to opposing, yet
reasonable, interpretations of the parties’ intent, it will be construed
against its drafter.84 Under this framework, a clause that allows suit
to be filed in either a state or federal court in a particular state or
county can be classified as exclusive so long as it contains the
requisite language of exclusivity.85
B. Lack of Uniformity Problem:
Determining How the Federal Courts
Will Treat a Particular Forum-Selection Clause
Once a federal court has classified a forum-selection clause as
exclusive or non-exclusive, it can determine the appropriate
81. K & V Scientific Co., Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft (“BMW”),
314 F.3d 494, 499 (10th Cir. 2002); N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines
Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 1995); John Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v.
Attiki Imps. & Distribs. Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 52–53 (2d Cir. 1994); Xerox Corp. v. Premiere Colors,
LLC, No. 3:10-CV-412, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106566, at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2010); Gita
Sports Ltd. v. SG Sensortechnik GmbH & Co. KG, 560 F. Supp. 2d 432, 436 (W.D.N.C. 2008);
Hsu v. OZ Optics Ltd., 211 F.R.D. 615, 618 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Intermetals Corp. v. Hanover Int’l
Aktiengesellschaft Fur Industrieversicherungen, 188 F. Supp. 2d 454, 460–61 (D.N.J. 2001).
82. It is appropriate to label these clauses “non-exclusive” rather than “permissive” because
doing so more accurately reflects their definition.
83. Ocwen Orlando Holdings Corp. v. Harvard Prop. Trust, LLC, 526 F.3d 1379, 1381 (11th
Cir. 2008); K & V Scientific, 314 F.3d at 498; Docksider, Ltd. v. Sea Tech., Ltd., 875 F.2d 762,
763–64 (9th Cir. 1989); Xerox, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106566, at *5. In addition to the exclusive
and non-exclusive categories, one court has held that there is a third category of forum-selection
clauses to consider. Ocwen, 526 F.3d at 1381. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that there are
also “hybrid clauses.” Id. A hybrid clause is one that is non-exclusive regarding a plaintiff’s
decision as to where to file suit, but exclusive as to a defendant’s acceptance of the plaintiff’s
choice of venue. Id. In Ocwen, the court found the following clause to be a hybrid: “SELLER
AND PURCHASER, WAIVE ANY OBJECTION TO THE VENUE OF ANY ACTION FILED
IN ANY COURT SITUATED IN THE JURISDICTION IN WHICH THE PROPERTY IS
LOCATED AND WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO TRANSFER ANY SUCH ACTION FILED IN
ANY COURT TO ANY OTHER COURT.” Id. While this category may be adopted by other
courts in the future, currently the Eleventh Circuit is the only one that has recognized it.
Therefore, at this point, it is simply noteworthy and will not be discussed going forward.
84. Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1987); Citro
Fla., Inc. v. Citrovale, S.A., 760 F.2d 1231, 1232 (11th Cir. 1985); Intermetals, 188 F. Supp. 2d at
461; Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Willingham, 791 F. Supp. 614, 619–20 (N.D. Miss. 1992).
85. Excell, Inc. v. Sterling Boiler & Mech., 106 F.3d 318, 321 (10th Cir. 1997). In that case,
the court held that a forum-selection clause providing “[j]urisdiction shall be in the State of
Colorado, and venue shall lie in the County of El Paso, Colorado,” was exclusive. Id. In other
words, the language of the clause allowed suit to be filed in a federal court as long as the court
was located in El Paso County, Colorado. See id.
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mechanisms with which to enforce the clause.86 Unfortunately, there
is currently no uniform approach among the federal courts for
enforcing forum-selection clauses.87 Lower federal courts are most
noticeably divided about the appropriate procedural mechanisms for
enforcing exclusive forum-selection clauses.
Exclusive forum-selection clauses raise two important questions.
First, does an exclusive forum-selection clause make venue proper in
an otherwise improper forum?88 In other words, will a court enforce
an exclusive forum-selection clause when an action is filed in a
forum that the clause specifies, but in which venue is improper under
the applicable venue statute or statutes?89 The second, more
complicated question is whether an exclusive forum-selection clause
makes venue improper in an otherwise proper forum.90 In other
words, will a court enforce a clause at a defendant’s request when a
plaintiff has filed suit in a forum other than one that the clause
specifies, but in which venue is otherwise proper under the
applicable venue statute or statutes?91 This section will address each
of these questions independently.
1. Does an Exclusive Clause Make Venue
Proper in an Otherwise Improper Forum?
Federal courts have generally accepted that a forum-selection
clause can make venue proper in an otherwise improper forum.92 It
has long been established that venue—the place where judicial
authority may be exercised—though defined by legislation, is related
to the convenience of the parties and is, therefore, subject to their
disposition.93 Thus, venue statutes merely accord a defendant a
personal privilege with respect to venue, which she may assert, or
waive, at her own election.94 Therefore, parties can agree to venue in

86. See infra Part III.B.2.
87. Holt, supra note 71, at 1918–29.
88. See infra Part III.B.1.
89. See infra Part III.B.1.
90. See infra Part III.B.2.
91. See infra Part III.B.2.
92. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167–68 (1939).
93. Id. at 168.
94. Id.; Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Consol. Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177, 179 (1929); Lee v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 653, 655 (1923).
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an otherwise improper forum and, in effect, contractually waive their
rights to object to venue in the specified forum.
2. Does an Exclusive Clause Make Venue
Improper in an Otherwise Proper Forum?
Whether an exclusive forum-selection clause makes venue
improper in an otherwise proper forum will dictate the appropriate
procedural mechanism or mechanisms for enforcing the clause.95
Federal courts are sharply divided on this issue96 due to differing
interpretations of Stewart and Carnival Cruise.
In Stewart, the Court seemed to adopt the view that venue is
proper in a given forum, notwithstanding an exclusive forumselection clause to the contrary, so long as an applicable venue
statute is satisfied.97 Thus, since venue was proper in the Northern
District of Alabama—notwithstanding the forum-selection clause
designating Manhattan as the exclusive forum for litigation under the
contract98—a motion to transfer under § 1404(a) (the proper-toproper venue transfer statute99) rather than § 1406(a) (the improperto-proper venue transfer statute100) was appropriate for enforcing the
exclusive forum-selection clause.101 However, according to the Court,
the parties did not dispute whether the district court properly denied
the motion to dismiss for improper venue under § 1406(a).102 Thus,
the issue regarding the appropriate motion to transfer for enforcing
the forum-selection clause was technically not before the Court.103
The Court’s determination that § 1404(a), rather than § 1406(a), was
appropriate because venue was proper notwithstanding the forumselection clause was, therefore, arguably dicta.104

95. See infra Part III.B.2.a–b.
96. See infra Part III.B.2.a–b.
97. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30–31 (1988).
98. Stewart, notwithstanding the forum-selection clause, originally filed suit for breach of
contract in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Id. at 24.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 633–34 (1964).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 634.
101. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30–31.
102. Id. at 28 n.8. The Court seemed to blatantly ignore that Ricoh had in fact raised the issue
in its appellate brief. Resp’t Br. on the Merits, Stewart, 487 U.S. 22 (No. 86-1908).
103. Flake v. Medline Indus., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 947, 951 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
104. Id.; Georgene M. Vairo, Effect of Forum Selection Clauses, in 17 MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE-CIVIL § 111.04(4)(a)(ii) (2011).
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The Court added to the confusion with its decision in Carnival
Cruise.105 Although transfer was surely a viable alternative for
enforcing the forum-selection clause in that case,106 the Court did not
address whether the action should have been transferred, and if so,
under which statute.107 Nor did the Court remand the case for
consideration of the transfer issue.108 It merely held, in one sentence,
that it reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.109 On remand,
the Ninth Circuit apparently read the Supreme Court’s decision as
reinstating the district court’s unconditional dismissal.110 Thus, it
affirmed the judgment of the district court “for the reasons set forth
in [the Supreme Court’s decision],”111 which effectively dismissed
the action because of the forum-selection clause.112 Since § 1404(a)
only permits transfer, the Court arguably overruled Stewart and
endorsed § 1406(a) as the appropriate mechanism for enforcing
exclusive forum-selection clauses.113
The confusion that these cases have created manifests itself in
the variety of approaches that federal courts have adopted for
enforcing exclusive forum-selection clauses in the context of both
motions to dismiss and motions to transfer.
a. Motions to dismiss based on
valid exclusive forum-selection clauses
The federal courts are especially divided regarding which
motions to dismiss are appropriate for enforcing exclusive forumselection clauses. One approach is to treat these motions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) (“12(b)(3)”) as motions to
dismiss for improper venue.114 Courts that employ this approach, at
least implicitly, hold that a valid exclusive forum-selection clause
105. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
106. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30–31; Vairo, supra note 104, § 111.04(4)(a)(iii).
107. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 589–97; Vairo, supra note 104, § 111.04(4)(a)(iii).
108. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 589–97; Vairo, supra note 104, § 111.04(4)(a)(iii).
109. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 597.
110. Vairo, supra note 104, § 111.04(4)(a)(iii).
111. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 934 F.2d 1091, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991); Vairo, supra note
104, § 111.04(4)(a)(iii).
112. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 589.
113. Flake v. Medline Indus., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 947, 952 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
114. See, e.g., Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir.
2006).
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makes venue improper in all forums except those that the clause
specifies.115 Conversely, the courts that denounce the 12(b)(3)
approach generally hold that exclusive forum-selection clauses do
not make venue improper in an otherwise proper forum.116 Courts
that subscribe to this latter principle have analyzed motions to
dismiss based on exclusive forum-selection clauses under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (“12(b)(1)”), 12(b)(6)
(“12(b)(6)”), and the federal common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens.117
Currently, it appears that the majority of federal courts analyze
motions to dismiss based on exclusive forum-selection clauses under
12(b)(3) as motions to dismiss for improper venue. The Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all endorsed
this approach.118 The Eighth Circuit has yet to resolve the issue;119
115. See id. at 550–51.
116. E.g., LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pac. Sewer Maint. Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1984)
(holding that an exclusive forum-selection clause did not make venue improper because venue
was otherwise proper under the applicable federal venue statute); TriState HVAC Equip., LLP v.
Big Belly Solar, Inc., No. 10-1054, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112574, at *36 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20,
2010) (denying the 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause because “the
Third Circuit has held that a forum-selection clause does not render venue improper in an
otherwise proper forum”).
117. E.g., Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming the
district court’s dismissal based on an exclusive forum-selection clause pursuant to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens); LFC Lessors, 739 F.2d at 7 (holding that a motion to dismiss based on an
exclusive clause “should have been filed under 12(b)(6), urging dismissal for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted” (citation omitted)); Cfirstclass Corp. v. Silverjet PLC,
560 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (treating a motion to dismiss based on a forumselection clause as a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
118. Baker v. Adidas Am., Inc., 335 Fed. App’x 356, 359 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The validity of a
forum-selection clause is properly analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) . . . .”
(citation omitted)); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A motion to
enforce a forum[-]selection clause is treated as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(3) . . . .”); Trafigura Beheer B.V. v. M/T PROBO ELK, 266 F. App’x 309, 311 (5th Cir.
2007) (dismissing the case based on an exclusive forum-selection clause that provided for
exclusive venue in certain foreign courts because the United States was an improper forum);
Auto. Mechs. Local 701 Welfare & Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 502 F.3d
740, 746 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It is not entirely clear whether a motion seeking dismissal based on a
forum[-]selection clause, including an arbitration clause, is better conceptualized as an objection
to venue, and hence properly raised under Rule 12(b)(3), or as a failure to state a claim, and thus
properly raised under Rule 12(b)(6). Wright and Miller observe, however, that ‘most of the
decided cases use [Rule 12(b)(3)] as the basis’ for deciding such a motion. This court has
followed the majority rule.” (citation omitted)); K & V Scientific Co., Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren
Werke Aktiengesellschaft (“BMW”), 314 F.3d 494, 497 (10th Cir. 2002) (“A motion to dismiss
based on a forum[-]selection clause frequently is analyzed as a motion to dismiss for improper
venue under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3).” (citing Riley v. Kinglsey Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969
F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir. 1992))); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285,
1290 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e hold that motions to dismiss upon the basis of choice-of-forum . . .
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however, the district courts within the circuit appear to uniformly
employ the 12(b)(3) approach.120 The Second Circuit is similarly
undecided, but, unlike the district courts in the Eighth Circuit,
Second Circuit district courts are split as to the appropriate motion to
use.121 Courts in the Second Circuit have, on different occasions,
analyzed motions to dismiss based on exclusive forum-selection
clauses under 12(b)(1),122 12(b)(3),123 and 12(b)(6).124 The First and

clauses are properly brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) as motions to dismiss for improper
venue.”); Commerce Consultants Int’l, Inc. v. Vetrerie Riunite, S.p.A., 867 F.2d 697, 699–700
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (affirming the district court’s dismissal based on an exclusive forum-selection
clause under 12(b)(3)).
119. Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v. EklecCo, L.L.C., 340 F.3d 544, 545 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“Rainforest moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6) of Civil Procedure. Although
not addressed below, we recognize that there is some controversy as to whether Rule 12(b)(3) or
12(b)(6) is the proper vehicle for bringing a motion to dismiss based on improper venue when the
issue turns on a forum[-]selection clause in the parties’ underlying contract . . . . The question
appears to be open in this circuit, and we need not address it in this appeal since EklecCo has
moved under both subsections of Rule 12.”).
120. Webb Candy, Inc. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., No. 09-CV-2056 (PJS/JJK), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55985, at *10 (D. Minn. June 7, 2010) (“[T]his Court agrees with the circuit courts and
district courts that have held that a motion to dismiss on the basis of a forum-selection clause is
properly brought as a motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), and not as a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) (or as a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)).”); CFMOTO Powersports Inc. v. NNR
Global Logistics USA, Inc., No. 09-2202 (JRT/JJK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113058, at *6 n.2
(D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2009) (“The Eighth Circuit has not definitively decided the question of whether
a motion to dismiss pursuant to a forum-selection clause is properly brought under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or 12(b)(6) . . . . District courts in this circuit, however, have
determined that a 12(b)(3) motion is a proper vehicle by which to challenge venue under a forumselection clause.”); Tockstein v. Spoeneman, No. 4:07CV00020 ERW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82849, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2007) (“Because most circuits that have decided that Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(3) is the proper vehicle for seeking enforcement of a forum[-]selection clause . . . the
Court will treat Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the forum[]selection clause as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).”).
121. See Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384, 393 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming in
part the district court’s 12(b)(3) dismissal for improper venue based on an exclusive forumselection clause); Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V., 145 F.3d 505,
508 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Because the district court based its decision to grant [defendant’s]
motion to dismiss on the court’s finding of a forum-selection clause, the dismissal is founded on
Rule 12(b)(6).”); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P’ship, 740 F.2d 148, 152, 160 (2d Cir.
1984) (affirming the lower court’s dismissal under 12(b)(1) based on an exclusive forumselection clause).
122. AVC Nederland, 740 F.2d at 152, 160; Cfirstclass, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 326–27 (“There is
a split of authority in the Second Circuit regarding the appropriate procedural mechanism by
which to enforce a forum[-]selection clause . . . . [Defendant] brings the present motion pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1), which the Court believes is appropriate.”).
123. See Phillips, 494 F.3d at 384, 393.
124. S.K.I. Beer Corp. v. Baltika Brewery, 612 F.3d 705, 707, 712 (2d Cir. 2010); Evolution
Online, 145 F.3d at 508 n.6.
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Third Circuits have clearly held that courts should analyze these
motions under 12(b)(6).125 Finally, separate panels in the Sixth
Circuit, in two fairly recent decisions, have endorsed the use of both
12(b)(6) and the doctrine of forum non conveniens126 as appropriate
vehicles for enforcing valid exclusive forum-selection clauses.127
b. Motions to transfer based on
valid exclusive forum-selection clauses
Courts also disagree about the appropriate motion to transfer for
enforcing exclusive forum-selection clauses. Similar to the courts’
confusion regarding motions to dismiss, this disagreement is largely
due to uncertainty as to whether such a clause makes venue improper
in all but the specified forum or forums.128 Again, the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Stewart and Carnival Cruise are to blame for
this confusion.129 Some courts hold that exclusive forum-selection
clauses vitiate otherwise proper venue and, therefore, § 1406(a)
applies. However, others hold that such clauses do not affect venue
and, thus, § 1404(a) controls.130 Under the former approach, a valid
125. Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (“In this
circuit, we treat a motion to dismiss based on a forum[-]selection clause as a motion alleging the
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).”); Instrumentation
Assocs., Inc. v. Madsen Elecs. (Canada) Ltd., 859 F.2d 4, 6, 9 (3d Cir. 1988) (granting a motion
to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause pursuant to 12(b)(6)).
126. The use of forum non conveniens for enforcing forum-selection clauses has not really
caught on in any significant way; the Sixth Circuit appears to be the only circuit that still
explicitly endorses it. Therefore, this approach, mentioned here simply to further highlight the
pervasive disagreement among federal courts, will not be discussed further.
127. Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that forum non
conveniens was the appropriate procedural vehicle through which to enforce a valid exclusive
forum-selection clause); Langley v. Prudential Mortg. Capital Co., LLC, 546 F.3d 365, 366 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“Because a valid and enforceable contract exists, we vacate and remand for the
district court to entertain a motion to enforce the forum[-]selection clause under FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6) . . . .”).
128. See Haskel v. FPR Registry, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 909, 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
129. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
130. Flake v. Medline Indus., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 947, 950–51 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (comparing
Haskel, 862 F. Supp. at 913–16 (finding a forum-selection clause unenforceable by motion to
dismiss for improper venue), and Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1112 n.1 (1st Cir. 1993)
(dismissal for improper venue based on forum-selection clause inappropriate), with Jones v.
Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (dismissal for improper venue based on
forum-selection clause appropriate), and Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456, 1457 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (motion to dismiss based on forum-selection clause properly considered as
motion to dismiss for lack of venue)). Compare Se. Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Maximus, Inc., 387
F. Supp. 2d 681, 684–86 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (employing the § 1404(a) approach), and Water
Energizers Ltd. v. Water Energizers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 208, 210–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying
§ 1404(a) to a motion to transfer based on an exclusive forum-selection clause), with Hoffman v.
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exclusive forum-selection clause will carry dispositive weight in the
transfer-dismissal analysis.131 Under the latter approach, courts
disagree about the appropriate weight that an exclusive forumselection clause will carry in the transfer analysis. Some courts hold
that such clauses are the most important—and often dispositive—
factor in making the § 1404(a) transfer determination.132 Others hold
that courts should give such clauses neither dispositive weight nor
zero weight in the transfer analysis.133 This is yet another example of
the pervasive lack of uniformity that plagues federal forum-selection
clause jurisprudence.
IV. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
Many courts, including federal courts, recognize the freedom to
contract regarding the forum in which disputes arising under an
agreement shall be adjudicated.134 However, the most important
purpose of forum-selection clauses—to provide predictability,
stability, and foreseeability as to where suits arising under a
contractual agreement can or will be litigated135—has been severely
undermined by the lack of uniformity among federal courts regarding
the enforcement of such clauses.136 The remainder of this Note will
examine the aforementioned predominant approaches that federal
Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that a motion to transfer based
on an exclusive forum-selection clause is “more appropriately treated under section 1406(a)”),
and Russo v. Ballard Med. Prods., 352 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182 (D.R.I. 2005) (granting a motion to
transfer based on an exclusive forum-selection clause under § 1406(a)).
131. See Russo, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 182; Hoffman, 571 F. Supp. at 550–51.
132. REO Sales, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 925 F. Supp. 1491, 1493 (D. Colo. 1996)
(“[I]t is clear that an enforceable forum-selection clause will often carry the day when making a
section 1404(a) determination.”). See Outek Caribbean Distribs., Inc. v. Echo, Inc., 206 F. Supp.
2d 263, 266 (D.P.R. 2002) (acknowledging the considerable weight of the forum-selection clause
in determining whether to transfer to a different forum); Black & Veatch Constr., Inc. v. ABB
Power Generation, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 569, 581 (D. Kan. 2000) (deeming the existence of an
exclusive forum-selection clause the most important factor in the transfer analysis).
133. See, e.g., Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 537–38 (6th Cir. 2002); Tex.
Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Dunn, No. H-09-3514, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82765, at *9–10 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 13, 2010); Ohio Learning Ctrs., LLC v. Sylvan Learning, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1062, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70575, at *13 (N.D. Ohio July 14, 2010); Shoremaster, Inc. v. Hanson Marine
Props., No. 09-1099-CV-W-FJG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42837, at *15 (W.D. Mo. May 3, 2010).
134. See Richard T. Franch et al., Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Are Both Crucial:
Parties to International Agreements Should Give Careful Thought to Each, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 11,
2002, available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFs
1252%5C296%5CNLJweb.pdf.
135. See supra Part I.
136. See supra Part III.
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courts employ when enforcing valid and enforceable exclusive
forum-selection clauses in order to (1) illustrate how those
approaches function when courts apply them; (2) highlight their
strengths and weaknesses; (3) propose a simple uniform solution to
the forum-selection clause problem; and (4) explore the practical and
doctrinal implications of that proposal.
A. The Motion to Dismiss Problem:
Examining the Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Approach
As noted supra, courts are divided about the proper motion to
dismiss for enforcing exclusive forum-selection clauses—12(b)(1),
12(b)(3), or 12(b)(6).137 When examining how each of those motions
operates, it becomes apparent that 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are both
practically and doctrinally unfit to be employed in the forumselection clause context. The 12(b)(3) approach, on the other hand,
does not suffer from the same pitfalls and, thus, is more appropriate
for enforcing exclusive forum-selection clauses.
First, when a court analyzes a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on an exclusive forumselection clause, it must operate under the precept that the clause
somehow affects the court’s power to adjudicate the dispute.138
However, the argument that forum-selection clauses tend to “oust”
federal courts of jurisdiction is little more than an archaic legal
fiction that the Supreme Court dispelled in The Bremen.139 The basis
on which a defendant seeks dismissal when invoking a forumselection clause—namely, that the agreement between the parties
prohibits the litigation from proceeding in a particular forum—is
completely unrelated to the basis of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction (that is, either federal question jurisdiction or diversity of
citizenship).140
Forum-selection clauses designate venue,141 which concerns
whether the geographic location of a lawsuit is convenient for a just

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
1986).

See supra Part III.B.2.a.
Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 548 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998).
Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir.
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resolution of the dispute.142 Venue is considered a defendant’s
personal right that the defendant can waive or alter by agreement.143
Subject-matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, imposes nonwaivable
structural limits on a court’s power to adjudicate a dispute.144 Thus, a
forum-selection clause cannot alter the court’s ability to exercise
subject-matter jurisdiction. However, because venue is related to the
convenience of the parties and is, therefore, subject to their
disposition,145 it seems intuitive that a valid and enforceable
exclusive forum-selection clause can render venue improper in a
forum that would otherwise be proper under an applicable venue
statute.
Additionally, when a court treats a motion to dismiss based on
an exclusive forum-selection clause as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court
may only consider facts and documents that are part of, or
incorporated into, the complaint.146 Under this standard, the pleadings
are accepted as true147 and the court’s analysis is confined therein.148
In contrast, when a court treats a motion to dismiss based on a
forum-selection clause under 12(b)(3), it may freely consider
evidence outside the pleadings.149 The latter is far more consistent
with the Court’s decision in The Bremen, which provided that a
forum-selection clause is presumed valid unless the resisting party
presents evidence that enforcing the clause would be unreasonable
under the circumstances.150
Finally, and most importantly, forum-selection clauses
determine venue,151 and judicial economy requires that selection of
the proper forum for adjudication be made as early as possible in the

142. IDES & MAY, supra note 3, at 403.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939).
146. Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting TransSpec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008)).
147. Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2006).
148. Rivera, 575 F.3d at 15.
149. Sucampo Pharms., 471 F.3d at 549–50.
150. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
151. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir.
1986).
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litigation.152 However, using 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) to enforce forumselection clauses severely undermines this axiom.153 A 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss “is non-waivable and may be brought at any
time—even on appeal—regardless of whether a litigant raised the
issue in an initial pleading.”154 Therefore, under the 12(b)(1)
approach, litigants can withhold their forum-selection clause
objections until after substantial judicial resources have been
expended—until after discovery or even after an adverse verdict.155
Similarly, a party may bring a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss at any time
during litigation prior to adjudication on the merits.156 Thus, as with
the 12(b)(1) approach, under the 12(b)(6) approach, litigants can
withhold their forum-selection clause objections until after
substantial expenditure of judicial resources.157
Conversely, because courts disfavor 12(b)(3) motions to dismiss
for improper venue, under this approach, a defendant must raise the
forum-selection clause issue in her first responsive pleading or waive
the right to invoke the clause altogether.158 Thus, unlike the 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) approaches, the 12(b)(3) approach will result in
efficient disposition of cases involving forum-selection clauses and
will avoid wasting judicial resources on cases that will ultimately
have to be dismissed and relitigated in a different forum.159
B. The Motion to Transfer Problem:
§ 1404(a) Versus § 1406(a)
When a plaintiff files suit in a forum other than that designated
by an exclusive forum-selection clause, a defendant may, instead of
moving to dismiss, ask the court to enforce the clause by transferring
the case to the designated forum.160 Unfortunately, as with most
152. Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 830 (7th Cir. 1995).
153. See id.; Sucampo Pharms., 471 F.3d at 548–49.
154. Sucampo Pharms., 471 F.3d at 548.
155. Id. at 549.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. Id.; Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 830 (7th Cir. 1995) (“An objection to venue
must be made at the earliest possible opportunity.”).
159. Sucampo Pharms., 471 F.3d at 549.
160. See supra Part III.B.2.b. A motion to transfer is not available when enforcing a forumselection clause that does not have a federal court option because a federal district court cannot
transfer a case to a state or foreign court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (2006). Thus, if an
exclusive forum-selection clause requires that suit be brought in either a particular state court or a
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aspects of federal forum-selection clause jurisprudence, federal
courts are divided as to which motion to transfer is appropriate for
enforcing such clauses—§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a).161 In order to
appreciate how these motions differ in practice, it is helpful to
examine how they each function.
1. The Van Dusen v. Barrack Rule
Under § 1404(a), a “district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”162
Thus, the statute allows transfer from one proper forum to another.163
In Van Dusen v. Barrack,164 the Supreme Court held that when a
court grants a motion to transfer under § 1404(a), the transferee court
must apply the state law that the transferor court would have applied
had there been no change of venue.165 This rule stems directly from
the central policy that underlies the Erie doctrine, which the Supreme
Court laid out in Erie v. Tompkins166—that a “suit by a non-resident
litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block away
should not lead to a substantially different result” because of the
mere happenstance of federal diversity jurisdiction.167 The Van Dusen
rule is intended to “ensure that the ‘accident’ of federal diversity
jurisdiction does not enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a
result in federal court which could not have been achieved in the
courts of the State where the action was filed.”168 This purpose would
be defeated if non-resident (diverse) defendants, properly subject to

court in a foreign country, it cannot be enforced via transfer, but only via dismissal. See IDES &
MAY, supra note 3, at 427–28; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a).
161. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
163. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 633–34 (1964) (discussing the difference
between § 1404(a) and § 1406(a)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 639; IDES & MAY, supra note 3, at 423 (explaining that under Van Dusen, the
substantive law that the transferor court would have applied follows the case to the transferee
court).
166. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court there held that in diversity cases, federal courts should
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Id. at 79–80.
167. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 638 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945)).
168. Id.
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suit in the transferor state, could invoke § 1404(a) to gain the
benefits of the transferee jurisdiction’s law.169
Under § 1406(a), a party can transfer a suit from an improper
venue to a proper one.170 Unlike a transfer under § 1404(a), when a
court transfers a case under § 1406(a), the transferee court need not
apply the law that the transferor court would have applied because
that law does not follow the case.171 The reason for this difference is
that the Erie concerns that arise when transferring from one proper
venue to another do not exist when transferring from an improper
venue to a proper one.172 A transfer under § 1406(a) is appropriate
when a plaintiff has improperly exercised his or her venue privilege
and the defendant is not properly subject to suit in the forum where
the action was originally filed.173 Thus, a § 1406 transfer does not
create a situation where the accident of federal diversity jurisdiction
enables a defendant to utilize the transfer “to achieve a result in
federal court which could not have been achieved in the courts of the
State where the action was filed.”174 This is because the case could
not have properly been heard in the forum in which it was originally
filed, and, thus, the laws of that venue would not have applied in the
first place.175
2. Sections 1404(a) and 1406(a):
Application and Implications
This sub-section will employ a hypothetical exclusive forumselection clause to illustrate the aforementioned differences between
§§ 1404(a) and 1406(a) and their implications on the forum-selection
clause analysis. Imagine two parties: Al and Beth. Al resides in State
169. Id. (“What Erie and the cases following it have sought was an identity or uniformity
between federal and state courts; and the fact that in most instances this could be achieved by
directing federal courts to apply the laws of the States ‘in which they sit’ should not obscure that,
in applying the same reasoning to § 1404 (a), the critical identity to be maintained is between the
federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was
filed.” (citation omitted)).
170. Id. at 634; 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case
laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or . . . transfer such case to any
district or division in which it could have been brought.” (emphasis added)).
171. IDES & MAY, supra note 3, at 423.
172. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 638.
173. See id. at 634, 638.
174. See id. at 638.
175. See id. at 634, 638.
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Y, whose law, like federal law, looks favorably on forum-selection
clauses. Beth resides in State X. Al and Beth enter into a contract
that contains an exclusive forum-selection clause providing that “any
dispute or lawsuit arising under or out of this contract must be
brought in a court located in State X.” Beth allegedly breaches the
contract. Al then files suit for breach of contract based on diversity
jurisdiction in a federal district court in State Y because State Y’s
law is considerably more favorable to his case than that of State X.
Beth then moves to enforce the contractual forum-selection clause
via transfer to the designated forum (State X). Assume venue is
proper in State Y under the applicable venue statute.
The forum-selection clause in the Al-Beth contract is an
exclusive clause that by its very terms prohibits litigation anywhere
other than in a court in State X.176 Thus, the district court in State Y
can enforce the clause by transferring the case to a district court in
State X.177 However, the vehicle it uses to do so will depend on
whether the court is one that adheres to the precept that exclusive
forum-selection clauses make venue improper in all but the
designated forum.178 If the court finds that such clauses do so, it will
grant Beth’s motion to transfer under § 1406(a)—the improper-toproper venue transfer statute179—notwithstanding that venue is proper
in State Y under the applicable venue statute.180 Thus, the suit will be
transferred to a federal court in State X pursuant to the forumselection clause, and the State X court (the transferee court) will
resolve the dispute pursuant to its own substantive law.181
Conversely, if the court finds that exclusive forum-selection
clauses do not make otherwise proper venues improper, the court
176. See supra Parts III.A, IV.B.2.
177. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (2006). It could also dismiss, but for purposes of
illustration, dismissal will not be discussed. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
178. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 634.
180. See supra Part IV.B.2.
181. When a court transfers a case under § 1406(a), the law of the transferor does not follow
the case. IDES & MAY, supra note 3, at 423. In practice the law to be applied on transfer is tied to
choice of law principles. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 627–28. Thus, when a case is transferred
under § 1406(a), the transferee court will apply its own choice of law principles, which may or
may not dictate that its own substantive law applies when deciding the merits. See id.; IDES &
MAY, supra note 3, at 423. However, for purposes of simplicity, assume that in this hypothetical
State X’s choice of law principles dictate that its own substantive law applies to the merits of the
Al-Beth dispute.
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will treat Beth’s motion to transfer under § 1404(a)—the proper-toproper venue transfer statute.182 Thus, like what occurs under
§ 1406(a), the case will be transferred to a federal district court in
State X.183 However, unlike under § 1406(a), under § 1404(a), the
State X court (the transferee court) must apply the substantive law
that the State Y court (the transferor court) would have applied when
resolving the dispute,184 and in this case, State Y law is more
favorable to the plaintiff’s (Al’s) case than is State X law.185
Due to the difference between §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a), the
motion-to-transfer problem implicates the twin aims of Erie—to
discourage forum-shopping and to avoid inequitable administration
of the law.186 First, it encourages forum-shopping by allowing
plaintiffs who want to circumvent an exclusive forum-selection
clause to do so by filing suit in a federal district court that employs
the § 1404(a) approach. For example, in the Al-Beth dispute, the
substantive law of the forum that is designated in the forum-selection
clause (State X) is potentially deleterious to Al’s case.187 Thus, Al
has a considerable incentive to “shop” for a federal court that
employs the § 1404(a) approach in a forum whose laws are more
favorable to his case (for example, State Y).188 If he succeeds, he can
more or less avoid enforcement of the forum-selection clause.189
Although the court will enforce the clause’s geographic terms and
transfer the suit to the designated forum, Al can still avoid the
application of the unfavorable substantive law of the designated
forum (State X) and enjoy the more favorable substantive law of the
transferor state (State Y).190

182. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 634.
183. Section 1404(a) is discretionary and the court could retain the case if it so desires.
However, because State Y favors forum-selection clauses, assume that the court is one that gives
valid and enforceable exclusive forum-selection clauses near-dispositive weight in the transfer
analysis.
184. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.
185. See supra Part IV.B.2. Again, for purposes of simplicity, assume that in this hypothetical
State Y’s choice of law principles dictate that its own substantive law applies to the merits of the
Al-Beth dispute. See supra note 181.
186. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
187. See supra Part IV.B.2.
188. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.
189. See supra Part IV.B.2.
190. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.
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Second, the motion-to-transfer problem promotes inequitable
administration of the law. In a single dispute between one pair of
parties (such as the Al-Beth dispute), the forum-selection clause (a
freely negotiated contract provision) will have a substantially
different effect depending on the approach that the court employs.191
If the court employs the § 1406(a) approach, it will transfer the case
to the designated forum (State X), and the substantive law of that
forum will guide the resolution of the dispute.192 Alternatively, if the
court employs the § 1404(a) approach, the case will still be
transferred to the designated forum (State X), but the transferee court
will have to apply the substantive law of the transferor court (the
State Y court) when resolving the dispute.193 Thus, if the substantive
laws of the transferor and transferee courts differ significantly, as
they do in this hypothetical,194 the substantive outcome of the case
will be completely different depending on which motion to transfer
the transferor court employs.
V. THE REMEDY:
A SIMPLE UNIFORM SOLUTION
A. The Supreme Court Should Act
The Supreme Court must remedy the problems that plague
federal forum-selection clause jurisprudence so that forum-selection
clauses can serve their primary function—to provide predictability,
stability, and foreseeability to contractual relationships regarding
where litigation may occur.195 The Supreme Court should either
promulgate a new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure196 specifically
addressing the problems outlined supra or grant certiorari to a case
on point to provide a remedy by way of judicial holding.
Under either approach, the Court should provide the following.
First, notwithstanding applicable federal venue statutes, a valid and
enforceable exclusive forum-selection clause—a clause that contains
191. See supra Part IV.B.2.
192. IDES & MAY, supra note 3, at 423.
193. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.
194. See supra Part IV.B.2.
195. See supra Part I.
196. “The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure . . . for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(a) (2006).
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clear, unambiguous language of the parties’ intent to make the
specified forum or forums compulsory and exclusive197—renders
venue improper in any forum but those designated in the clause.
Second, federal courts must use federal procedural mechanisms to
enforce valid and enforceable exclusive forum-selection clauses—
when enforcing such a clause, a court may either dismiss the case
under 12(b)(3) or § 1406(a), or transfer the case to the specified
forum under § 1406(a). Regardless of whether the Supreme Court
does decide to act and adopt this rule (“the Rule”), the lower federal
courts that currently employ the 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and § 1404(a)
approaches should take it upon themselves to do so.
B. The Supreme Court’s Rule:
How It Would Solve the
Forum-Selection Clause Problem
If the Supreme Court were to act to create the Rule, it would
alleviate the practical and doctrinal problems that currently plague
the enforcement of exclusive forum-selection clauses in federal
court. It would abrogate the confusion that The Bremen, Stewart, and
Carnival Cruise198 created by providing federal courts with a clear set
of guidelines for enforcing exclusive forum-selection clauses.
Namely, the Rule would alleviate the current confusion among
federal courts regarding the proper procedural mechanisms to use
when enforcing exclusive forum-selection clauses.199 It would
reaffirm that courts should use federal procedural mechanisms to
enforce valid and enforceable exclusive forum-selection clauses.200
Additionally, by providing that exclusive forum-selection clauses
make venue improper in all but the forum or forums that are
specified in the clause, and by specifically providing that courts
should use 12(b)(3) and § 1406(a) to enforce such clauses,201 the
Court would eradicate the possibility of confusion regarding both the
proper motion to dismiss and the proper motion to transfer.

197. See, e.g., K & V Scientific Co., Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft
(“BMW”), 314 F.3d 494, 499 (10th Cir. 2002).
198. See supra Parts II–III.
199. See supra Part III.B.
200. See supra Part III.
201. See supra Part V.A.
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The Rule would alleviate the doctrinal concerns surrounding the
motion-to-dismiss problem.202 Enforcing a forum-selection clause
under 12(b)(3)203 is consistent with the basis on which a defendant
seeks dismissal when invoking a forum-selection clause—namely,
that the agreement between the parties prohibits the litigation from
proceeding in a particular forum.204 Additionally, the Rule is
consistent with the federal standard of validity and enforceability of
forum-selection clauses205 because it allows a court to freely consider
evidence outside the pleadings.206 Most importantly, it would
promote judicial economy207 because under 12(b)(3) a defendant
must raise the forum-selection clause issue at the earliest possible
moment or risk waiving the clause altogether.208
Similarly, the Rule would alleviate the doctrinal concerns
surrounding the motion-to-transfer problem.209 By requiring that
motions to transfer based on exclusive forum-selection clauses be
treated under § 1406(a) rather than under § 1404(a), the Rule would
preclude the possibility that a plaintiff could use transfer to
circumvent the effect of a forum-selection clause.210 Moreover, it
would ensure the preservation of the twin aims of Erie.211 Under this
uniform approach, plaintiffs would have no incentive to shop for a
forum with a more favorable approach because there would be only
one available approach. Furthermore, inequitable administration of
the law would be avoided because the effect of an exclusive clause
would not turn on the court’s approach.212

202. See supra Part IV.A.
203. A motion to dismiss for improper venue. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3).
204. Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998); see
supra Part IV.A.
205. See supra Part IV.A. This standard is used when federal court jurisdiction is derived
from something other than diversity—as in admiralty cases. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
206. Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 549–50 (4th Cir. 2006).
207. Id. at 549; see supra Part IV.A.
208. Sucampo Pharms., 471 F.3d at 549 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)); Frietsch v. Refco,
Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 830 (7th Cir. 1995) (“An objection to venue must be made at the earliest
possible opportunity.”); supra Part IV.A.
209. See supra Part IV.B.
210. See supra Part IV.B.2.
211. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
212. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The current disarray of federal forum-selection clause
jurisprudence mandates judicial attention. At this point, it is nearly
impossible to predict the effect that a given exclusive forumselection clause will have on federal court proceedings. The primary
purpose of forum-selection clauses—to provide predictability,
stability, and foreseeability to contractual relationships—has been
severely undermined by federal courts’ failure to adopt a uniform
enforcement approach. The Supreme Court should make substantial
efforts to develop a uniform federal approach so that contracting
parties can fairly predict how a forum-selection clause will affect
litigation in federal courts. A Supreme Court holding, or a new
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, that clearly outlines such an
approach will abrogate the pervasive confusion among federal
courts,213 thereby creating a more predictable environment in which
the courts can uphold parties’ expectations.

213. Again, if the Supreme Court fails to act, lower federal courts that currently employ the
12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and § 1404(a) approaches should take it upon themselves to abrogate the
current disarray of federal forum-selection clause jurisprudence by adopting the Rule.

